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2006]
ENDANGERED STATUTE? THE CURRENT ASSAULT
ON THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
PHILIP WEINBERG*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act (ESA),' a keystone congressional
environmental protection measure, is itself endangered. Widely en-
dorsed as vitally needed ever since its 1973 enactment, the ESA-
and particularly its provision safeguarding critical habitats-has in
recent years come under relentless assault. As part of an attempt to
roll back environmental protection, the usual suspects have not
only resisted vigorous enforcement of the ESA, but have contended
it exceeds Congress's powers. So far, no court has actually so held,
but some dissenting opinions and law review articles have claimed
the commerce power does not support the ESA, at least as it relates
to regulating land used to prevent the loss of habitat for endan-
gered fish and wildlife.2
This Article submits that Congress acted well within its powers
in enacting the ESA. Its habitat provisions are not only constitu-
tionally valid but are vitally needed if the ESA's purposes "to pro-
vide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species and threatened species depend may be conserved" are to be
achieved. 3 Further, a definitive Supreme Court ruling to that effect
will clarify and strengthen federal jurisdiction under the Clean
Water Act (CWA),4 currently under a similar challenge.
* Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. The author is in-
debted to Louis Gioia (St. John's University School of Law 2006) for research assis-
tance in preparing this Article.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (2000).
2. See, e.g., Justin Gregory Reden, Note, The Commerce Clause Appropriately De-
fined Within a Universe Without Distinction: The Federal Endangered Species Act's Uncon-
stitutional Application to Intrastate Species, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 649, 675 (2003)
(arguing ESA is unconstitutional as applied to intrastate species); cf Katrina L.
Fischer, Harnessing the Treaty Power in Support of Environmental Regulation of Activities
That Don't "Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce": Recognizing the Limits of the New
Federalism, 22 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 167, 170 (2004) (stating it is unlikely "that the present
day interpretation of the scope of Section 9 of the ESA would have been arrived at
under the shadow of the Lopez-Morrison holdings").
3. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (b) (explaining why habitat provisions of ESA are
needed).
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
(389)
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II. THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT: A SUMMARY
Congress enacted the ESA (the Act) in 1973 to furnish substan-
tial congressional protection for species of fish, wildlife and plants
found to be endangered or threatened. Like most federal environ-
mental legislation, it is firmly grounded in Congress's authority
under the Commerce Clause.5
Although Congress was not writing on a totally clean slate, the
Act vastly strengthened earlier legal safeguards for endangered spe-
cies. The first significant congressional protection for the egret-
whose feathers were in demand by fashion-conscious milliners-as
well as other migratory birds, was overturned by the courts nearly a
century ago as interfering with the states' power to regulate hunting
under the Tenth Amendment.6 Those rulings were based on the
doctrine that wildlife was literally the property of the states, a no-
tion inherited from English common law, and thus could not be an
article of commerce, even after the bird was taken and became a
commodity in the economic sense. The Supreme Court upheld
this notion in 1896 when it decided Geer v. Connecticut.7
A treaty with Britain, implemented in the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act of 1918,8 was required to empower Congress to protect
egrets under the then-current expansive reading of the Tenth
Amendment. That statute was sustained by a unanimous Court in
Missouri v. Holland,9 where Justice Holmes presciently and elo-
quently noted that the treaty power trumped Tenth Amendment
concerns and that "[t]o put the claim of the State upon title is to
lean upon a slender reed."' 0 Foreshadowing the recognition of en-
vironmental concerns that were to surface decades later, Justice
Holmes went on to describe the covered birds as "the protectors of
our forests and our crops ...."'
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress power to regulate inter-
state commerce).
6. See United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154, 157 (E.D. Ark. 1914) (holding
statute protecting migratory birds invalid); United States v. McCullagh, 221 F. 288,
296 (D. Kan. 1915) (invalidating statute protecting migratory birds).
7. 161 U.S. 519, 530 (1896).
8. See Pub. L. No. 65-186, 40 Stat. 755 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§§ 703-712 (2000)).
9. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
10. See id. at 434 (stating state power to regulate killing and sale of game is not
exclusive).
11. See id. at 435 (expressing importance in protecting environment through
protecting specific species).
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The slender reed finally snapped in Hughes v. Oklahoma,12
when the Court in 1979 ruled that wildlife, once caught, is indeed
an article of commerce subject to regulation. But the regulation, a
law barring the shipment of minnows beyond Oklahoma's borders,
in that case was adopted by the state, not Congress. The Court held
the state law discriminated against interstate commerce in violation
of the dormant Commerce Clause. 3
Congress had earlier adopted the Lacey Act in 1900, which
prohibited the interstate shipment of wildlife taken in contraven-
tion of state law.14 This statute was clearly valid even under the
then-narrow construction of the commerce power because the Su-
preme Court had sustained federal laws similarly barring interstate
traffic in lottery tickets and other items regarded as immoral or oth-
erwise harmful.15 It is worth noting that the Court, rejecting the
claim that upholding similar laws might enable Congress to "arbi-
trarily exclude from commerce... any article," ruled that the "pos-
sible abuse of a power is not an argument against its existence."' 6
Indeed, the Lacey Act has been upheld as a valid exercise of the
commerce power. 17
It was not until 1969 that Congress significantly expanded the
Lacey Act. The Endangered Species Conservation Act' 8 of that year
empowered the Secretary of the Interior to promulgate a list of en-
dangered animals and bar the importation or sale of those animals
or any product made from them. 19 But the list was comprised of
only subspecies on the verge of extinction, leading to the comment
that it was more commemorative than protective. Listing only sub-
species of tigers, crocodiles and similar endangered species af-
forded scant protection. It is difficult for customs officials to
12. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
13. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. NewJersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978) (hold-
ing invalid NewJersey statute prohibiting importation of most solid or liquid waste
collected outside New Jersey).
14. See Pub. L. No. 97-79, 31 Stat. 187 (1900) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. §§ 42, 43, 16 U.S.C. §§ 701, 3371-3378).
15. See Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (holding federal government
may regulate interstate traffic in lottery tickets).
16. See id. at 362-63 (discussing possible dangers of holding).
17. See United States v. Romano, 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996) (upholding
Lacey Act). For a discussion of Lacey Act, see infra notes 104-11 and accompany-
ing text. See also United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475 (9th Cir. 1996) (uphold-
ing, as against similar claims, Bald Eagle Protection Act). For a discussion of the
Bald Eagle Protection Act, see infra note 116 and accompanying text.
18. Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, repealed by 87 Stat. 903 (1969).
19. See id. (setting forth Secretary of the Interior's power under Endangered
Species Conservation Act).
2006]
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identify the particular subspecies from a skin at the airport or load-
ing dock. This led New York to enact a far more protective statute,
the Mason Law, 20 in 1969, which bans the sale of skins or articles
made from all varieties of tigers, leopards, alligators and the like.21
That law was upheld against claims of federal preemption and un-
due burden on commerce, paving the way for other states' legisla-
tion.2 2 It also encouraged the Secretary of the Interior to
strengthen the federal list because it essentially closed New York, a
major fashion and apparel market, to endangered species.
In 1973, Congress enacted the present ESA. Building on the
earlier Act, it affords protection to threatened as well as endan-
gered species and, most relevant to the current challenges, empow-
ers the Secretary to safeguard the critical habitat of endangered
species of both animals and plants. 2 3 It further bars federal agen-
cies from taking actions "likely to jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or threatened species" or its
critical habitat.2 4 The legislative history of the ESA emphasized the
need to preserve endangered species for scientific and genetic pur-
poses. The House Report found "l[t] he value of [their] genetic her-
itage is, quite literally, incalculable. [T]hey are potential
resources[:] potential cures for cancer or other scourges, present
or future .... "25 This legislative history, however, sheds virtually no
light on whether Congress enacted the ESA under its commerce
power, although its control of imports and sales surely falls within
recognized Commerce Clause authority.26 In addition, the Senate
Report noted that many endangered species "perform vital biologi-
cal services to maintain a 'balance of nature' within their environ-
20. N.Y. ENVrL. CONSERV. LAw § 11-0536 (McKinney 2006).
21. See id. (banning sale of certain wild animals or wild animal products).
22. SeeA.E. Nettleton Co..v. Diamond, 264 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y. 1970), app. dism.
sub nom. Reptile Products Ass'n v. Diamond, 401 U.S. 969 (1971) (upholding New
York's prohibition of sale of certain wild animal products).
23. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a) (1), (3) (2000) (setting out Secretary's powers in
relation to ESA).
24. See id. at § 1536(a) (2) (prohibiting all federal agencies from jeopardizing
critical habitat of any endangered or protected species).
25. H.R. RFP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990,
quoted in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978) (demonstrating Con-
gress's concern for unknown uses of endangered species and their unforeseeable
place in ecosystem).
26. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942) (upholding congressional regulation of sales).
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ments" and noted "the need for biological diversity for scientific
purposes."27
The habitat provision soon reached the Supreme Court in Ten-
nessee Valley Authority v. Hill (Hill),28 the so-called "snail darter case."
The Secretary found construction of a dam by the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA), a federal agency, would result in the extinction of
an endangered fish.29 Because the ESA requires federal entities to
"use . . .all methods and procedures which are necessary" to pre-
serve endangered species, Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, affirmed an injunction against its construction.30 The valid-
ity of the ESA was not questioned in this lawsuit. The Court
pointed out that "Congress has spoken in the plainest of words,
making it abundantly clear that the balance has been struck in favor
of affording endangered species the highest of priorities .... 31
Congress amended the ESA in the wake of this decision, pro-
viding for an inter-agency Endangered Species Committee with au-
thority to exempt agencies from the provision barring them from
actions jeopardizing endangered or threatened species where a par-
ticular project had regional significance.3 2 Contrary to congres-
sional expectations, that committee voted not to exempt the dam
from the Act's mandate, largely because the dam was not needed to
generate electric power-the raison d'etre for the TVA-and was
to flood a great deal of farmland to create a recreational lake.33
That determination was, however, trumped by Congress. No doubt
acting on the precept that there are times to rise above principle,
Congress attached a rider to a budget bill explicitly requiring com-
pletion of the dam notwithstanding any provision of the ESA.3 4
The bill was enacted and the dam finished. 35 In an 0. Henry twist
27. See S. REP. No. 93-307, reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2990 (explaining
purpose of Senate Report).
28. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) [hereinafter Hill].
29. See id. at 161-62 (discussing Secretary's finding about dam construction).
30. See 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3) (providing required procedures). See also 16
U.S.C. § 1536(2) (setting forth restricted activity); Hill, 437 U.S. at 193-94.
31. See Hill, 437 U.S. at 194 (stating congressional support for protection of
endangered species).
32. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(e) (establishing Endangered Species Committee).
33. See Margot Hornblower, Panel Junks TVA Dam; Cites Cost, Not Snail Darter,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 24, 1979, at A12 (noting reasons other than snail darter for bar-
ring dam's barred completion).
34. See Energy and Water Development Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-69, 93 Stat. 437 (1979) (making available 148.6 million dollars to TVA).
35. See Pete Earley & Dale Russakoff, Tiny Snail Darter Swims Off the Endangered
List, WASH. POST, July 6, 1984, at A17 (noting snail darter moved off endangered
species list).
2006]
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ending, additional snail darters were discovered in adjacent
streams, and the fish was taken off the endangered list.3
6
Aimed in large measure at halting the hunting of endangered
species as well as imports and sales of those species or articles made
from them, the Act in recent years has been increasingly used to
protect their habitats. At first, as in Hill, its habitat provisions ap-
plied only to federal agencies. In 1995, however, the Supreme
Court ruled that destroying an endangered species habitat
amounted to a "taking"-that is, killing-of that species, in viola-
tion of the Act.3 7 This widened the reach of the ESA to protecting
habitats from damage notjust from federal government entities but
from private actors, states and municipalities. For example, in
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton (Rancho Viejo),38 the Interior Depart-
ment's Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) ordered a developer to re-
move a fence that interfered with the habitat of the endangered
arroyo toad. 39 It is these habitat-protecting determinations that
have triggered recent challenges to Congress's authority to enact
the ESA.
III. THE ACT AND THE COMMERCE POWER
Little thought seems to have been spent in 1973 as to Con-
gress's authority to enact the ESA. Had the issue arisen, its power
under the Commerce Clause would surely have been seen as the
basis for the Act. The statute, after all, regulates importation and
sale both of articles derived from endangered species and the ani-
mals and plants themselves-clearly matters substantially related to
interstate and foreign commerce.40 The ESA followed on the heels
of the Clean Air Act41 and the CWA,42 whose validity under the
Commerce Clause seemed crystal clear. Perhaps most important,
Supreme Court decisions since the late 1930s had uniformly upheld
congressional legislation on a wide variety of subjects as valid under
the commerce power. 43 There was not a cloud on the horizon in-
36. See id. (noting presence of fish in Alabama and Georgia).
37. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687, 707-08 (1995) (expanding taking provision to private actors).
38. 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Rancho Viejo].
39. See id. at 1065 (discussing facts).
40. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538 (outlining prohibited acts).
41. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7 67 1(q). (2000).
42. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
43. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding
federal law as to labor relations); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118-19 (1941)
(upholding federal law as to wages and hours); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128
(1942) (finding Commerce Clause power appropriate dealing with agriculture);
6
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hibiting federal power pursuant to the Commerce Clause. Indeed,
not too long after the ESA's enactment, the Court sustained an en-
vironmental statute regulating land use, the Surface Mining Con-
trol and Reclamation Act, 44 as a valid exercise of the commerce
power 45-the very concern that was raised more recently regarding
the ESA.
In the past decade though, the Court began to find that some
congressional enactments exceeded the commerce power. Con-
gress may likely have shrugged off that prospect and legislated with
blithe unconcern over its constitutional limits. The Court quite
rightly ruled in United States v. Lopez 4 6 that a federal law criminaliz-
ing mere possession of a handgun near a school bore no substantial
relation to commerce. 47 Congress soon amended the statute to re-
quire that the gun moved in, or otherwise affected, the stream of
commerce. 48 Again, in United States v. Morrison,49 the Court set
aside a federal law creating a tort cause of action for gender-moti-
vated violence, finding no sufficient link to commerce.5 0 ChiefJus-
tice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, pointed out that such crimes
"are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity." 51 The
Court rejected the government's claim "that gender-motivated vio-
lence affects interstate commerce by deterring potential victims
from traveling interstate, from engaging in employment in inter-
state business," and the like, sensibly finding these effects too atten-
uated to substantially affect commerce. 52
Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964) (upholding fed-
eral law as to racial discrimination in public accommodations); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971) (finding regulations dealing with loansharking
permissible under commerce power).
44. 30 U.S.C.S. § 1276 (1977).
45. See Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 268
(1981) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314,
317 (1981) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenge).
46. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
47. See id. at 564 (holding handgun possession law invalid under Commerce
Clause).
48. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 657, 110
Stat. 3009, 3009-369 to 3009-372 (1996) (declaring violence near schools has de-
creased quality of education).
49. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) [hereinafter Morrison].
50. See id. at 645 (holding law had insufficient link to commerce).
51. See id. at 613 (refuting attempt by government to show link to commerce).
52. See id. at 615 (rejecting attempt to create but-for causal link between vio-
lent crime and interstate commerce). The Court held that the Commerce Clause
did not authorize Congress to enact a civil remedy in the Violence Against Women
Act. See id. at 607 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994)).
2006]
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The Court easily distinguished cases like Heart of Atlanta Motel
v. United States (Heart of Atlanta),53 which upheld the Civil Rights
Act of 1964's ban on racial discrimination by restaurants and other
places of public accommodation, 54 because the conduct Congress
regulated there was plainly commercial in nature. 55 It specifically
rebuffed arguments like those that carried the day in Heart of At-
lanta that gender-based violence, like racial discrimination in hotels
and restaurants, curtailed interstate travel and employment.56
More recently, the Court averted a commerce power clash by
narrowly construing a provision of the CWA. Solid Waste Agency of
Northern Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC) 5 7 in-
volved a Corps regulation requiring a permit to place landfill in
ponds used as habitat for migratory birds.58 The Government ar-
gued that here too, with clear relevance to the ESA, the commerce
power reached the safeguarding of migratory birds' habitat because
their hunting and viewing involved prodigious amounts of inter-
state travel and economic activity. 59 The challenge, of course, as-
serted that this was a replay of Lopez and Morrison, noting that the
rule covered ponds whether or not navigable, and questioned Con-
gress's power to regulate a non-navigable waterway.60 In another 5-
to-4 decision (as were both Lopez and Morrison), the Court finessed
the constitutional issue and found the CWA did not support the
Corps' rule. 61 The CWA is by its terms applicable to "the waters of
the United States" without regard to their navigability, 62 although
the specific provision dealing with discharges of landfill and the
like, Section 404, speaks of "navigable waters. '63 Concluding that
"there are significant constitutional questions," the Court steered
53. 379 U.S. 241 [hereinafter Heart of Atlanta].
54. See id. at 250 (finding Congress had ample power to enforce equal access
to public accommodations through Commerce Clause). See also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000a(b) (2000) (banning discrimination or segregation in establishments "af-
fecting interstate commerce").
55. See id. at 250, 243-44 (holding law valid under Commerce Clause). See also
42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2000).
56. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635 (concluding gender-based violence does not
affect interstate commerce although racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions does).
57. 531 U.S. 159 (2001) [hereinafter SWANCC].
58. See id. at 162 (recapping facts of case).
59. See id. at 193 (noting specific regulated activity at issue).
60. See id. at 165-66 (noting petitioner's argument).
61. See id. at 162 (holding extension of "navigable waters" definition in CWA
to include migratory bird habitats exceeded Corps' authority under CWA). CWA
section 404(a) does not extend to the waters at issue in the case. See id.
62. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (defining "navigable waters" in statute).
63. See id. § 1344(a) (noting provisions for issuing permits for dredging).
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clear by finding no "clear statement from Congress that it intended
Section 404(a) to reach" this non-navigable waterway. 64 The ruling
leaves the ball in Congress's court to amend the CWA to explicitly
apply to non-navigable lakes and ponds. 65
The Supreme Court recently has ruled in a case raising similar
issues. In United States v. Rapano, 66 the Sixth Circuit held CWA Sec-
tion 404 applied to a wetland connected to navigable waters only by
a man-made ditch or drain.67 The court found this constituted a
hydrologic connection and thus a "significant nexus between the
wetlands and navigable waters" as required by SWANCC.68 The Su-
preme Court, in a closely divided ruling, remanded for the lower
courts to decide whether the wetlands at issue fell within Section
404. Justice Kennedy, who cast the deciding vote, adopted the "sig-
nificant nexus" test.6 9 The Court did not reach the constitutional
question, just as in SWANCC, though Justice Scalia's plurality opin-
ion, which garnered four votes, concluded "the Corps' interpreta-
tion stretches the outer limits of Congress's commerce power."70
What light do these decisions shed on the validity of the ESA?
While some scholars have seen Lopez and Morrison as a conservative
Court's assault on congressional power,71 the better-reasoned view,
I submit, is that they were belated wake-up calls to a complacent
Congress that had simply taken for granted its ability to legislate on
subjects far beyond its commerce power. 72 But what of the ESA?
Surely the bulk of the Act, dealing with imports and sales of endan-
64. See SWANCC, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001) (highlighting respondents raised
"significant constitutional questions").
65. See Philip Weinberg, It's Time for Congress to Rearm the Army Corps of Engi-
neers: A Response to the Solid Waste Agency Decision, 20 VA. ENVrL. L.J. 531 (2001)
(discussing SWANCC case).
66. 376 F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded, 126 S. Ct. 2208 (2006).
67. See id. at 632 (noting holding).
68. See id. at 638-39 (quoting SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 167) (noting minority of
courts have read SWANCC to limit CWA's jurisdiction to "navigable waters and
non-navigable waters that directly abut navigable waters").
69. See Rapanos v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 2208, 2248 (2006) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining Kennedy's test).
70. See id. at 224 (citing Scalia's opinion).
71. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservative and Progressive Legal Orders: Progressive
and Conservative Constitutionalism as the United States Enters the 21st Century, 67 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 53 (2004); Louis J. Virelli III & David S. Leibowitz, "Federalism
Whether They Want it or Not": The New Commerce Clause Doctrine and the Future of Fed-
eral Civil Rights Legislation After United States v. Morrison, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 926
(2001) (noting other scholars' opinions).
72. See Lamar F. Jost, The Commerce Clause in the New Millennium: Enumeration
Still Presupposes Something Not Enumerated. United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740
(2000), 1 Wvo. L. Rrv. 195 (2001) (noting court's duty "to impose 'meaningful
limits' on Congress's commerce power").
20061
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gered species or goods made from their hides, is a thoroughly valid
exercise of the commerce power. So too is the Act's regulation of
federal agency activities, an unexceptionable subject of congres-
sional authority. It is the Act's restrictions on property owners that
have raised some scholarly and judicial eyebrows, and on which this
Article will focus.
IV. Is THE ACT SUBSTANTIALLY RELATED TO COMMERCE?
The Act's provisions preventing the destruction of habitat
clearly bear a substantial relation to commerce, as required by Lo-
pez. As noted, the ESA prohibits any person from taking, or at-
tempting to take, an endangered species, 73 and, as we have seen,
encompasses the destruction of its habitat.7 4 In National Association
of Home Builders v. Babbitt (Home Builders),75 the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit sensibly upheld
these provisions. 76
Home Builders challenged a ruling of the FWS, the arm of the
Department of the Interior charged with ESA implementation,
aimed at protecting an endangered fly's habitat.77 Despite its ex-
otic name, that species, the Delhi Sands Flower-Loving Fly is found
only in a small area near San Bernardino, California.78 The FWS
notified San Bernardino County that a proposed road intersection
near a planned hospital would injure that habitat and therefore
would likely violate the Act.79 The county, joined by others, as-
serted the Act's habitat provision exceeded congressional power.80
Judge Wald, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit, af-
firmed the lower court's judgment upholding the statute., But the
court fragmented as to whether, and if so how, the taking provision
was a valid exercise of the commerce power. Lopez held Congress
may regulate the channels of commerce (interstate transport), the
instrumentalities of commerce (trains, vehicles and the like), and
matters substantially related to commerce (economic activities such
73. See 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a) (1) (noting unlawful actions in reference to endan-
gered species).
74. See id. § 1532(19) (defining "take").
75. 130 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Home Builders].
76. See id. at 1043 (upholding ESA's taking provision).
77. See id. (noting facts).
78. See id. (noting fly's habitat is located within "eight mile radius" in San
Bernardino County).
79. See id. (noting construction would likely result in "taking").
80. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1043 (asserting that section 9 of ESA exceeds
Commerce Clause power).
81. See id. at 1043 (noting holding).
10
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as working conditions) .82 Judge Wald found the taking statute valid
both as a regulation of the channels of commerce and as substan-
tially related to commerce.8 3 Judge Henderson, concurring, relied
on its substantial relation to commerce alone. 84 And Judge Sen-
telle, dissenting, concluded neither category applied.85
Judge Wald noted that Congress and reviewing courts may look
to "the aggregate effect of the extinction of all similarly situated
endangered species. '8 6 Wickard v. Filburn (Filburn) ,87 which she
found "directly analogous" to this case, 88 is useful here. That Su-
preme Court decision sustained a federal law limiting the amount
of crops farmers might produce, in order to reduce supply and thus
raise prices during the Great Depression. 89 The Court upheld the
law as to a farmer diverting a small volume of wheat for his own use,
holding the fact that his action "may be trivial by itself is not
enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where,
as here, his contribution, taken together with that of many others
similarly situated, is far from trivial."90
Based on Filburn, Judge Wald concluded the statute was valid as
a regulation of the channels of commerce, prohibiting takings of
endangered species "to enable the government to control the [ir]
transport" and "to keep the channels of interstate commerce free
from immoral and injurious uses."91 This is a bit of a stretch. The
connection between safeguarding a species' critical habitat and en-
suring that it can be shipped in commerce is tenuous, particularly
as to a fly, as here, unlikely to be a subject of intentional transport
between states.
Judge Wald, joined by Judge Henderson, was plainly on more
solid ground in upholding the taking provision as substantially re-
lated to commerce, relying on Filburn. Here, she aptly noted the
scientific consensus that every species is a potential genetic or medi-
82. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995) (noting extent of
Commerce Clause powers).
83. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046 (highlighting court's reasoning).
84. See id. at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (upholding statute as substan-
tially related to commerce).
85. See id. at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (striking down taking provision).
86. See id. at 1046 (noting court does not only have to focus on effect of en-
dangered species at issue).
87. 317 U.S. 111 (1942) [hereinafter Filburn].
88. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1049 n.7 (noting aggregation analysis).
89. See Filburn, 317 U.S. at 128-29 (noting holding).
90. See id. at 127-28 (noting effects if Court allowed individual action to
stand).
91. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1046 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995))
(noting action is not commercial in nature).
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cal resource, whose loss is irretrievable.92 As the House Report on
the ESA noted, "[a]s we homogenize the habitats in which these
plants and animals evolved, ... we threaten their-and our own-
genetic heritage."93 Thus, Judge Wald ruled, "[t] he elimination of
all or even some of these endangered species would have a stagger-
ing effect on biodiversity. . . and, thereby, on the current and fu-
ture interstate commerce that relies on the availability of a diverse
array of species." 94 She went on to note that the takings statute
"regulat[es] the conditions under which commercial activity takes
place" and is therefore sustainable on that ground as well, 95 as in
the decisions upholding the Surface Mining Act.96
Concurring, Judge Henderson sensibly rejected the channels-
of-commerce approach. She agreed that Congress is empowered to
protect biodiversity, not because endangered species necessarily
have scientific or medicinal value, but because "the loss of biodiver-
sity itself has a substantial effect on our ecosystem and likewise on
interstate commerce. ' 97 She relied on the congressional finding in
the ESA that "development untempered by adequate concern and
conservation" is a significant cause of extinction, 98 so that "Con-
gress contemplated protecting endangered species through regula-
tion of land and its development, which is precisely what the
Department has attempted to do here."99 This was especially
true where, as here, the regulation involved a traffic intersection
and a hospital, each with a clear "connection with interstate
commerce." 100
92. See id. at 1050-51 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)) (describing
value of endangered species' genetic heritage).
93. See id. at 1050 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-412, at 4-5 (1973)). See also Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178-79 (1978). Congress enacted the ESA in part
due to concerns "about the unknown uses that endangered species might have and
about the unforeseeable place such creatures may have in the chain of life on this
planet." See id. (emphasis in original).
94. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1052 (explaining court's environmentally
sound rationale).
95. See id. at 1056 (explaining constitutional reasoning for holding).
96. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (citing another
instance where similar reasoning was used); see also Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314
(1981) (citing another statute to which such reasoning was used).
97. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1058 (Henderson, J., concurring) (explain-
ing opinion that environmental reasons alone are sufficient).
98. See id. at 1059 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (a)) (highlighting legislative pur-
pose in protecting biodiversity).
99. See id. (connecting actions of case to what Congress sought to prevent).
100. See id. (emphasizing relation to interstate commerce makes holding
more important).
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Judge Sentelle, dissenting, insisted the regulation concerned
"an activity which is neither interstate nor commerce."'10 1 He as-
serted, dubiously, that the Framers of the Constitution "certainly
[knew] as much about the dependence of humans on other species
and each of them on the land as any ecologist today."10 2 This as-
tounding remark casually shrugs off a century of scientific and med-
ical discovery as to the interdependence of species and their
environments, together with pharmaceutical uses of animals and
plants undreamed of in the eighteenth century.
It is particularly ironic thatJudge Sentelle quotes at length Jus-
tice Story's 1833 Commentaries to argue that Congress lacked
power here. 103 The great Justice was a product of his time, and
tellingly claimed Congress could not regulate manufacturing, agri-
culture, wages and roads,'0 4 all the subjects of federal legislation
whose validity not even Judge Sentelle would likely dispute.10 5
At about the same time as Home Builders, a federal court upheld
the Lacey Act, which, as amended in 1981, prohibits the purchase
of wildlife taken in violation of state law. 106 This amendment
strengthened the original Act, described earlier, that barred the in-
terstate shipment of such wildlife.107 In United States v. Romano (Ro-
mano) ,108 the court rebuffed a Commerce Clause challenge, noting
that "Congress has perceived a need to secure the long-term availa-
bility of scarce natural resources for commercial purposes." 10 9 Ro-
mano, however, involved a defendant who hired a guide and hunted
in violation of state law.110 As to this, the court, relying on cases like
Filburn, held that while "[a] solitary unlicensed hunter.., for sport,
101. See id. at 1061 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (concluding activity did not qual-
ify for interstate commerce with environmental purpose).
102. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1065 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (using fram-
ers' intent to show dependence on biodiversity is not new issue).
103. See id. at 1051 n.21 (relying on Justice Story's writings in arguing for stat-
tie's invalidation).
104. See id. at 1067 (citing JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITU-
TION § 1075 (1833)) (showing historical opinion which limited congressional
activity).
105. See Heart of Atlanta v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 271 (1964) (noting high-
ways subject to congressional regulation where needed to ensure fairness and
equality.
106. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (2) (A) (2000) (listing prohibited acts under Lacey
Act amendments).
107. See 18 U.S.C. § 42(a)(1) (2000) (focusing on prohibition of importation
or shipment of certain protected wildlife).
108. 929 F. Supp. 502 (D. Mass. 1996) [hereinafter Romano].
109. See id. at 508 (noting congressional concern for commercial effects of
illegal trade in fish and wildlife).
110. See id. at 503-04 (discussing facts).
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poses little or no threat to interstate commerce; a rash of illegal
hunting, on the other hand, may well result in a reduction in wild-
life-related goods and services." ' 1 It cited Perez v. United States,112
which sustained the federal loan-sharking statute: "[w]here the
class of activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of
federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individ-
ual instances of the class." 113
Finally, the court rebuffed the argument that Romano was not
himself engaged in commerce, a claim relevant to the ones voiced
in challenges to the ESA's habitat-taking provisions.114 As the court
held, the Supreme Court has upheld congressional regulation of
private non-commercial acts as long as their aggregate impacts sub-
stantially affect commerce. 1 5 National Organization for Women, Inc.
v. Scheidler" 6 sustained the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) as applied to persons threatening an
abortion clinic with violence, although their motives were ideologi-
cal and not commercial. 117
In the same vein, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit upheld the federal Bald Eagle Protection Act's provi-
sion barring possession of eagle feathers because "[b]oth com-
merce in and possession of eagle parts . . . have substantial effects
on interstate commerce, because both activities, even when con-
ducted purely intrastate, threaten the eagle with extinction."'"l 8
Closer to the issue here is Palila v. Hawaii Dept. of Land and Natural
Resources (Palila),'19 which sustained the ESA's taking provision as
applied to damage to the critical habitat of the palila, an endan-
gered bird. 20 The lawsuit alleged the state's maintenance of feral
111. See id. (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)) (distinguishing
Lopez).
112. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
113. See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (citing analysis of
court's power to restrict certain classes of activities).
114. See Romano, 929 F. Supp. at 506 (finding litigant was involved in
commerce).
115. See Home Builders, 130 F.3d at 1041, 1055 (interpreting Commerce
Clause).
116. 510 U.S. 249 (1994).
117. See id. at 250 (upholding Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zation Act as applied to antiabortion protesters).
118. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996) (explain-
ing Bald Eagle Protection Act forbids simple possession of eagle parts, not only
commerce or attempted commerce).
119. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Haw. 1979), affid, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981)
[hereinafter Palila].
120. See id. at 995 (upholding ESA's taking provision).
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sheep and goats was destroying the plants on which the bird de-
pends for survival. 12
1
The Palila court reaffirmed the ESA's validity as applied to this
bird as local to its state as were the species involved in Home Build-
ers. 122 It held "[a] national program to protect and improve the
natural habitats of endangered species preserves the possibilities of
interstate commerce in these species and of interstate movement of
persons, such as amateur students of nature or professional scien-
tists who come to a state to observe and study these species that
would otherwise be lost by state inaction." 123 The Palila court relied
on Hill, where the Supreme Court emphasized the congressional
finding with regard to protecting endangered species that "[t]he
value of [their] genetic heritage is, quite literally, incalculable."' 124
Most recently, Rancho Viijo1 2 5 explored some of these same is-
sues. There, the Interior Department restricted a landowner from
interfering with the habitat of the endangered arroyo toad. 126 The
District of Columbia Circuit reaffirmed the constitutionality of the
ESA's taking provision, adhering to Home Builders.127 The court ex-
plicitly ruled that nothing in Morrison,12s decided after Home Build-
ers, would alter this result.1 29 The concern in Rancho Viejo was that
excavating a streambed in order to construct homes, for which a
CWA section 404 permit is required, would jeopardize the toad's
habitat. 30 The District of Columbia Circuit rebuffed the claim that
the lack of congressional findings was fatal, pointing out that the
Supreme Court in Lopez and Morrison expressly ruled "Congress
normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substan-
tial burdens that an activity has on interstate commerce."'1 1 It
121. See id. (alleging state activity was harming Palila bird).
122. See id. at 994-95 (noting protecting endangered species is of utmost
importance).
123. See id. at 995 (elaborating on Congress's determination that major cause
of species extinction is natural habitat destruction).
124. See Palila, 471 F. Supp. at 994-95 n.37 (citing Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill,
437 U.S. 153, 177-78 (1978)) (noting Congress determined protection of endan-
gered species is of utmost importance).
125. 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
126. See id. (reviewing restricted activity).
127. See id. (following precedent in upholding ESA's taking provision).
128. For a full explanation about case, see supra notes 49-52 and accompany-
ing text.
129. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1071 (concluding Supreme Court's decision
in Morrison would not alter holding).
130. See id. at 1065 (discussing activity that would endanger arroyo toad).
131. See id. at 1069 (citing United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)),
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000)) (examining previous Supreme
Court decisions in evaluating lack of congressional findings).
20061
15
Weinberg: Endangered Statute - The Current Assault on the Endangered Specie
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
404 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. XVII: p. 389
noted that a 202-acre project near a major interstate highway, just
as with the hospital in Home Builders, "is presumably being con-
structed using materials and people from outside the state .... ,,132
In any event, the District of Columbia Circuit in Rancho Vijo
held, "the ESA regulates takings, not' toads. Morrison instructs that
'the proper inquiry' is whether the challenge is to 'a regulation of
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce."1 33 It cited
Teny v. Reno (Terry) ,1 which sustained as an exercise of the com-
merce power a federal statute regulating the obstruction of abor-
tion clinics by protestors. 135 The Terry court pointed out that the
regulated activity need not be commercial as long as it substantially
affects commerce-a view more recently reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court in Gonzales v. Raich (Raich), described later. 36
The Rancho Viejo ruling gave rise to the controversial dissents of
Judge Sentelle and Judge (now Chief Justice) Roberts questioning
the authority of Congress over habitat restrictions. The court de-
nied rehearing en banc in Rancho Viejo, with those two judges dis-
senting.13 7 Dissenting as he had in Home Builders, Judge Sentelle
emphasized the "noncommercial nature of the regulated entity and
activity" and argued that even if one were to look at the construc-
tion as the relevant activity, "construction of houses hardly consti-
tutes interstate commerce."1 3 He relied on GDFRealty Investments,
Ltd. v. Norton (GDJF),' 39 a United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit decision, as "explicitly reject[ing] the claim that fed-
eral regulation protecting a noncommercial species is permissible if
the activity constituting the 'take' was itself economic." 140 But GDF
actually sustained the Act as applied to regulating development on
an endangered species' habitat, holding there was the requisite sub-
132. See id. (noting out-of-state help in developing project).
133. See id. at 1072 (explaining it did not matter if court did not agree with
plaintiff's argument) (emphasis omitted).
134.' 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
135. See Rancho Viejo, 323 F.3d at 1072 n.10 (citing Teny v. Reno, 101 F.3d at
1072) (holding that commerce power could regulate anti-abortion protest).
136. See Terry, 101 F.3d at 1417-18 (determining commerce clause extends be-
yond commercial actors and has authority over individuals who interfere with com-
mercial activities in interstate commerce).
137. See Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d 1158 (Sentelle,J., dissenting) (disagreeing with
majority's determination that Congress can regulate taking because of commercial
activities of entity).
138. See id. at 1159-60 (arguing building houses does not constitute interstate
commerce).
139. 326 F.3d 622 (5th Cir. 2003) [hereinafter GDfI.
140. See Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1159 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) (suggesting
majority's conclusion conflicted with Supreme Court and Fifth Circuit decisions).
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stantial effect on interstate commerce where the "takes" are "aggre-
gated with those of all other endangered species." 14' Taking its cue
from Hill, the GDF court noted the potential in medicine and ge-
netics that "may lie locked up in the structures of plants which may
yet be undiscovered, much less analyzed." 42 GDF did reject the
claim that the commercial development of the parcel justified ap-
plying the Act because "Congress, through [the] ESA, is not directly
regulating commercial development," and it contended that "analy-
sis would allow application of otherwise unconstitutional statutes to
commercial actors, but not to noncommercial actors."14 3
Judge Roberts, as noted, also dissented in Rancho Viejo. He too
objected to the court asking "whether the challenged regulation
substantially affects interstate commerce, rather than [asking]
whether the activity being regulated does so" and also objected to
the court "sustain [ing] the application of the Act in this case be-
cause Rancho Viejo's commercial development constitutes inter-
state commerce . . . not because the incidental taking of arroyo
toads can be said to be interstate commerce, 1 144 He also relied on
the distinction raised in GDF.1 45 Judge Roberts concluded by sug-
gesting that en banc review would "afford the opportunity to con-
sider alternative grounds for sustaining application of the Act that
may be more consistent with Supreme Court precedent." 146
What are these alternative grounds? Judge Roberts referred to
a footnote in the original panel's Rancho Viejo decision highlighting
two decisions from other circuits sustaining similar federal stat-
utes. 14 7 One of these decisions is Gibbs v. Babbitt (Gibbs),'14 8 which
upheld a FWS regulation, adopted pursuant to the ESA that limits
the taking of wolves on private land.14 9 Writing for the court, Judge
Wilkinson ruled that "[i]nvalidating this provision would call into
question the historic power of the federal government to preserve
scarce resources in one locality for the future benefit of all Ameri-
cans."15 0 The court found " [t] he relationship between red wolf tak-
141. See GDF, 326 F.3d at 624 (holding ESA applies when there is substantial
effect on interstate commerce).
142. See id. at 632 (validating regulation based on scientific and medical value).
143. See id. at 634 (limiting scope of ESA to commercial actors).
144. See Rancho Viejo, 334 F.3d at 1160 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (noting ap-
proach of majority is contrary to Supreme Court holdings).
145. See id. (relying on GDFin reaching decision).
146. See id. (criticizing majority's reasoning for denying rehearing).
147. See id. at 1067 n.2 (citing "alternative grounds" through other decisions).
148. 214 F.3d 483 (4th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Gibbs].
149. See id. at 497 (upholding FWS regulation limiting taking of wolves).
150. See id. at 492 (specifying reason for holding).
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ings and interstate commerce is quite direct-with no red wolves,
there will be no red wolf related tourism, no scientific research, and
no commercial trade in pelts." 151 Thus, the taking of these species
is in fact an economic activity that may be aggregated as in Filburn
and Heart ofAtlanta-"especially so where, as here, the regulation is
but one part of the broader scheme of endangered species legisla-
tion."152 While the court described tourists' visits to red wolf habi-
tats in North Carolina in support of its holding, it emphasized that
those visits were to public lands, not the private parcels subject to
the hunting restriction, and noted that the ESA "was motivated in
part by the need to extend takings regulation beyond the limited
confines of federal land."15 3 In any event, the need to conserve
these species for scientific research exists whether or not tourists
travel to view them, and the court aptly held "[i]t is not for the
judiciary to move from species to species, opining that species A
possesses great commercial potential, but species B does not. 1' 54
The Gibbs court relied on the Ninth Circuit's holding in United
States v. Bramble,155 sustaining the Bald Eagle Protection Act, dis-
cussed earlier. That court emphasized, as did Home Builders, "the
interconnectedness of species and ecosystems," where Congress
could reasonably find "the extinction of one species affects others
and their ecosystems and that the protection of a purely intrastate
species . . .will therefore substantially affect land and objects that
are involved in interstate commerce."1 56
Finally, with particular relevance to the arroyo toad and similar
obscure and unglamorous species, the Gibbs court pointed out that:
the effects on interstate commerce should not be viewed
from the arguably small commercial effect of one local
taking, but rather from the effect that single takings multi-
plied would have on advancing the extinction of a spe-
cies. . . . [If] endangered species would lie beyond
congressional protection because there are too few ani-
mals left to make a commercial difference. Such reason-
151. See id. (describing relationship between hunting red wolves and inter-
state commerce).
152. See id. at 493 (indicating aggregation of economic activity is appro-
priate).
153. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 494 (describing intent of ESA to extend takings
regulation).
154. See id. at 495 (stating court's opinion).
155. 103 F.3d 1475, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996).
156. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1059 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (Henderson,J., concurring) (stating what Congress could reasonably find).
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ing would eviscerate the comprehensive federal scheme
for conserving endangered species and turn congressional
judgment on its head.157
Whatever doubt remained about whether the commerce power
encompasses activities such as habitat protection should have been
resolved earlier this year when the Supreme Court decided Raich.15 8
The Court upheld the Controlled Substances Act 159 as applied to
marijuana grown for home medical use, as authorized by a Califor-
nia law. 160 The federal law, if valid, of course preempted a conflict-
ing state law, and the Court sustained the Controlled Substances
Act's regulation of "purely local activities that are part of an eco-
nomic 'class of activities' that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce," citing Perez and Filburn.161 Writing for the Court, Jus-
tice Stevens noted that there only need be, and in fact was, a ra-
tional basis for Congress to find that growing marijuana for home
use substantially affects interstate commerce. 162 He pointed to the
enforcement problems in "distinguishing between marijuana culti-
vated locally and marijuana grown elsewhere, and concerns about
diversion into illicit channels .... "163 The fact that the marijuana
used medicinally by Raich was never in the stream of commerce was
irrelevant.
As Raich reminds us, Lopez itself, the poster child for the cur-
rent assault on the commerce power, reiterated that as long as "a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce,
the de minimis character of individual instances arising under that
statute is of no consequence."1 64 Raich further reaffirms that "the
absence of particularized findings [relating to interstate com-
merce] does not call into question Congress's authority to legis-
157. See Gibbs, 214 F.3d at 498 (stating how commercial effect should be
viewed).
158. 545 U.S. 1, 7 (2005) [hereinafter Raich].
159. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2000).
160. See Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11362.5 (2000) (stating meaning of Cali-
fornia Health and Safety Act).
161. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 16 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)) (stating Court sustained Controlled Sub-
stances Act).
162. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 2 (applying and finding rational basis in reaching
decision).
163. See id. at 24 (pointing to problems in distinction).
164. See id. at 17 (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 n.27 (1968))
(stating de minimis character of individual instances under statute is of no conse-
quence). See also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
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late. ' 165 What is especially significant to analysis of the ESA is the
statistic-not from Congress but from the President's Executive Of-
fice-that "American users spent $10.5 billion on the purchase of
marijuana. ' 166 The amount spent on viewing wildlife, including en-
dangered species, is likewise prodigious. 167
Which of the two approaches suggested in Home Builders and
Rancho Vijo better supports congressional authority to regulate tak-
ings through habitat destruction under the ESA? Each of them
fully justifies a court holding that Congress could rationally find the
activities the Act regulates are substantially related to interstate
commerce. Surely the irreversibility of extinction and the scientific
recognition of the medical and genetic importance of individual
species fits the bill. This is corroborated by the interdependence of
species in the food chain and the ecosystem they inhabit. One
scholar has pointed out the vital need for "maintenance of species
communities, compris[ing] the vast majority of organisms," where
communities of species control as well as depend on the existence
of individual species, even if some may not be economically impor-
tant, "although nature viewers and pharmaceutical firms would be
among those quick to dispute that assertion" of lack of economic
importance. 168 It is quite late in the day to seriously dispute these
facts. 169 They support congressional protection for the habitat of
arroyo toads as much as for alligators and bison. The authority of
Congress to act to protect subjects of its commerce power does not
hinge on their commercial importance or their appeal to
sightseers.
Just as with the small amount of wheat Filburn withheld from
the market or the economically insignificant loan-sharking of Pe-
rez, these species are not somehow immune from congressional
protection-any more than was the commercially unimportant
snail darter that was the subject of Hill. The ability of Congress to
165. See id. at 21 (stating that absence of particularized finding does not call
Congress's authority to legislate into question).
166. See id. at 21 n.31 (citing OFFICE OF NAT'L. DRUG CONTROL POLICY, MARI-
JUANA FACT SHEET 5 (Feb. 2004), http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.govpublica-
tions/factsht/marijuana/index.html) (emphasis omitted).
167. See Gibbs v. Babbitt, 214 F.3d 483, 493 (4th Cir. 2000) (highlighting en-
dangered species are part of billion dollar recreational, tourism and interstate
travel industry).
168. See Richard L. Knight, Ecosystem Management & Conservation Biology, 40
LANDSCAPE & URBAN PLANNING 41, 42 (1998) (pointing out needs of species
communities).
169. See George Miller, Ecosystem Management: Improving the Endangered Species
Act, 6 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 715 (Aug. 1996) (noting vital importance of
habitat conservation and interdependence of species and ecosystems).
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safeguard these endangered animals and plants, whether from
hunting or loss of habitat, surely bears a substantial relation to com-
merce in ways that carrying a gun near a school and gender-related
violence do not. The long history of federal control of endangered
species, extending back to the Migratory Bird Treaty to protect the
egret, bears witness to this. 17°
Similarly, the restrictions on taking endangered species by de-
stroying their habitat are equally valid because they, by definition,
concern commercial activities substantially linked to interstate com-
merce. Home Builders involved a traffic intersection adjacent to a
planned earthquake-proof hospital "to serve as the central emer-
gency burn center for the San Bernadino County area in the event
of an earthquake and to serve as a primary burn care center and
teaching facility. 1 71 The road was for emergency vehicle access to
that hospital. 172 Recognizing the economic stakes involved, the Na-
tional Association of Home Builders brought the lawsuit. Rancho
Viejo concerned a 202-acre housing development. 173 Can it seri-
ously be contended that these are not activities closely related to
interstate commerce? They surely implicate commerce more than
the home-grown marijuana in Raich. To deny that the construction
industry is substantially related to interstate commerce-a major in-
dustry subject to a host of federal laws such as the National Labor
Relations Act-would be to backpedal to the era that the Court en-
ded during the Great Depression. 174
It may be argued that, as Judge Ginsburg concluded in his con-
currence in Rancho Viejo, though "[t]he large scale residential devel-
opment that is the take in this case clearly does affect interstate
commerce ... the lone hiker in the woods, or the homeowner who
moves dirt in order to landscape his property ... does not .... 17 5
But that issue can await another day. Its likely answer will be that
the lone hiker and individual homeowner are not different from
the marijuana grower in Raich or the sole proprietor loan shark in
170. For a discussion of the history of federal control of endangered species,
see supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
171. See Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1044 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (stating circumstances for planned earthquake proof hospital).
172. See id. at 1045 (stating road's purpose).
173. See Rancho Viejo, L.L.C. v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(stating concern of case).
174. For a discussion of construction industry, see supra note 37 and accom-
panying text.
175. See Rancho Vijo, 323 F.3d at 1080 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (statingJus-
ice Ginsburg's conclusion).
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Perez-"de minimis... individual instances ... of no consequence"
in judging the validity of the statute.1 76
V. CONCLUSION
The courts should uphold the ESA's habitat provisions as valid
exercises of the commerce power. Failing to do so would not only
hamstring a vitally-needed statute whose importance is recognized
by the scientific community; it would also undermine congressional
authority to regulate activities clearly and substantially affecting in-
terstate commerce, threatening the CWA, gun control statutes and
a host of others. Lopez and Morrison set sensible boundaries for
Congress. The courts should not override them.
176. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (citations omitted) (stating likely
answer).
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